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“Inta qaran dhiskiisiyo, dhidibkiisu taagnaa, dheeraad nin dooniyo,
nin ku dhaga xaqiisoo, dhacsanaayay baa jiray.” [As long as the state
existed, there was a person who wanted to get more than his/her
share and one that resisted against that person and fought for
his/her rights] (Warsame 1993: 218).

I. Introduction
In today’s world, citizenship is linked to the modern nation-state system. Although there is a rich literature on the concept of citizenship,
in Somalia, it is a new idea that is contested and poorly understood by
the political classes. In conducting this study, I consulted with the text
of the Somali constitution, various legislations, and secondary literature. Additionally, I used the speeches and media interviews of Somali
politicians and clan elders. While conducting research on governance
challenges in Somalia (2008–2014), I interviewed a number of Somali
politicians, civil society members and business leaders. This article
starts with an explanation and review of the concept of citizenship.
Next, I explain how the legal system of Somalia and practices of its various governments address citizenship-related issues. Finally, I present
and analyze the key challenges and opportunities that state-builders
as well as citizens of Somalia face in constructing an inclusive national
citizenship.
II. Making Sense of Citizenship
Citizenship is about how an individual in a polity relates to other individuals and the state in which he or she is a member. From ancient
city-states in Greece to modern nation states, political theorists have
discussed the dimensions of the concept of citizenship and debated
who is included and who is excluded. During the Aristotelian era, citi-
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zens were understood as those individuals that could rule and be ruled
(women, the poor, slaves and immigrants were not included). However, with time, the concept has been refined and improved. In the
1950s, T. H. Marshall defined the concept of citizenship as equal and
“full membership of a community” (Marshall 1950: 8). Political theorists identified various approaches that can be employed to explain
the concept. This article only discusses the two dominant liberal and
communitarian approaches.
Marshall’s liberal conception starts with the individual as the primary rights holder. He identified three sets of rights for the individual:
civil (18th century), political (19th century) and social/economic rights
(20th century). Each set of rights was connected to one of the institutions of the state—civil rights (courts and justice institutions); political
rights (parliament and the executive); and social/economic rights (education and other service provision institutions) (Marshall 1950).
Communitarian theorists disagree with the liberals and argue that,
although necessary, meeting the basic individual rights is not sufficient in many cases. The communitarian approach presumes that the
individual-centric liberal approach neglects the importance of group
identities and group rights (nations, cultural groups and racial casts)
(Kymlicka 1995). According to Will Kymlicka, these groups seek different rights—self-determination, language rights, special representation and positive discrimination (Kymlicka 2004). As illustrated in
the many conflicts around the world, many states have been and are
still struggling with reconciling the individual rights of citizens and
the collective rights of groups within states. There are cases where
the solution, in the liberal approach, to subordinate group rights to
individual rights, has failed. The Aboriginal and Quebec disputes in
Canada are two contemporary examples.
In the context of Africa, many scholars explained the continent’s
experience in dealing with the concept of citizenship. Unlike many
European states that have been organic in their state formation, colonialists arbitrarily created contemporary African nation-states and
established artificial boundaries. As Alex Thomson notes, the “imperial
boundaries not only split social groups, they also caged them together
within these new nation-states” (Thomson 2010: 15). Explaining what
transpired after many African countries became independent, Peter
Ekeh identified “two publics” in Africa, contending that the African
individual is a citizen of a nation-state as well as a member of a communal group (Ekeh 1975). Keller agrees with Ekeh and maintains that
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national and sub-national identities are not necessarily “in competition
with one another” (Keller 2014: 27). However, Mahmood Mamdani, in
his seminal study on the issue, argues that colonialism denied Africans
citizenship, and instead maintained them as subjects (Mamdani 1996).
Scholars identify three challenges in establishing inclusive citizenship in the African context. First, in many African countries, political leaders often employ autochthony (indigeneity or sons of the soil
mentality—“I was in the area first”) for self-serving reasons. Many
well-known figures were disqualified from political competition on
the basis of an absurd claim that their parents were not born in the
country. The former president of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, and the
former prime minister of Cote d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, are examples of high-profile leaders who once were denied citizenship rights in
the countries they ruled (Boas and Dunn 2013; Manby 2010). Morten
Boas and Kevin Dunn cite Stephen Jackson, who asserts that autochthony is a “seductive weapon for political entrepreneurs” (Boas and
Dunn 2013: 28). Moreover, in the past, many people were denied their
citizenship and human rights, for example Rwandan Tutsis in the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Eritreans in Ethiopia. These were
grounded on the idea that the ethnicities or tribes they belonged to
were not indigenous to the area.
In addition, according to Lahra Smith, many African countries provide formal legal citizenship, but they cannot grant meaningful citizenship. For Smith, meaningful citizenship is “the ability and environment
for exercising the various rights of citizenship and discharging the
associated duties in a way that has practical and live implications in
one’s life, both on an individual and community level” (Smith 2013:
22). This is important, because provision of civil, political and social/
economic rights requires institutional capacities at the state level. In
many African countries, courts and executive branches do not deliver
these rights equally, because most state institutions in Africa have not
yet matured.
Furthermore, women in many African countries have been excluded
from the benefits of citizenship in many ways. For a long time, many
African countries, including Somalia and Swaziland, legally discriminated against women who married foreigners (Smith 2013). In this
case, women could not pass citizenship to their spouses or children.
However, because of pressure from human rights agencies and donor
countries, at least in the legal documents, this has changed for most of
the countries in Africa. That said, Somalia does not yet allow women
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to pass citizenship to spouses and children (UNHCR 2014: 4; Somali
Citizenship Law 1962), although this cannot be enforced. Besides this
conceptual clarification, I now turn to how Somalia’s laws and governments addressed the individual and group rights of Somali citizens.
III. Citizenship in Somalia: Legal Development
Like in any other country, Somali citizenship is linked to the Somali
nation-state, which is a new polity. As articulated in patriotic Somali
poems and songs composed during the liberation struggle, the Somali
state was conceived to represent and benefit all Somalis (Legum 1963).
Somalis resented and fought against the colonial partition of the
Somali people and wanted to replace colonialist administrations with
a state that united all of the five regions the Somali flag stands for (Italian Somaliland, British Somaliland, Western Somalia, Northern Front
District and Djibouti). In fact, during discussions on the future of the
Italian colonies (1948–1949), the Somali Youth League, the nationalist
movement, attempted to include a clause on the indivisibility of the
Somali people, which reflected the aspirations of Somalis at the time
(Trunji 2015). Later on, Somalia’s first constitution contained a similar
article that stipulated, “The Somali Republic shall promote, by legal
and peaceful means, the union of Somali territories” (Somali Constitution 1960).
In terms of rights, at least in theory, Somalia’s first constitution,
enacted in 1960, guaranteed civil, political and social/economic rights
to all citizens. In part two of the constitution, citizens have the right
to vote, the right to public office, the right to reside and travel freely
in any part of the territory of the state, and the right to political association. In addition, citizens have the “freedom of religion, thought
and to own property” (Somali Constitution 1960). Finally, Somalia’s
constitution clearly promised a number of social and economic rights
such as the right to education, health care and so on. The current
UN-sponsored draft constitution of 2012 contains an expanded set
of civil, political and social rights, although the article that called for
“greater Somalia”1 has been arbitrarily removed (Draft Constitution
for the Federal Government of Somalia 2012).
In answering the question of who is a citizen of the Somali state,
Somalia’s parliament enacted on 22nd December 1962 a law on Somali
citizenship, which reconciled the two different citizenship laws that
existed in British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland prior to 1960.
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According to the legislation, “any person who—by origin, language or
tradition—belongs to the Somali nation, shall be considered a Somali”
(Somali Citizenship Law 1962). As Paulo Contini wrote, this definition
is expansive and was meant to accommodate groups that do not consider themselves “ethnic Somalis” such as Arabs, Indians and Italians
(Contini 1967). On the other hand, ironically, the law follows the ethnic
conception at the same time and grants citizenship to anybody whose
father is a Somali citizen as long as that person does not have another
citizenship. As inclusive as it looks, the Somali citizenship law did not
allow women who marry non-Somalis to pass on citizenship to her
children or to her husband (Somali Citizenship Law 1962).
Ironically, even though the constitution is clear on civil, political,
social and economic rights of the citizen, Somalia’s current government (2012–2016) has enacted legislation that attempts to limit the
political rights of its citizens. The Somali Parliament passed the Districts and Regions Administration Act in July 2013, which adopted a
clause that prevents Somali citizens from seeking public office in all
regions of the country (Districts and Regions Administration Act 2013).
The act contradicts the article in the constitution that guarantees the
political rights of Somali citizens. To date, it has not been challenged
by the Supreme Court and, in theory, has become the law of the land.
Taken to its logical conclusion, each Somali can only seek public office
in the areas where his or her clan traditionally lived. In the past, this
mentality has been one of the drivers of clan conflicts in Somalia (see
also Marchal 2002). This claim, regardless of the region, is arbitrary
and might create conflicts in the future.
IV. Citizenship, Clan Identity and Islam
Each Somali citizen has many markers, but Somalis mainly identify
themselves by nationality (Somali), clan and religion (Islam) (Elmi
2010). At the national level in the 1940s, political class in general and
the Somali Youth League (SYL) in particular, adopted the rhetoric that
clannism was detrimental to nation building. This thinking was in
line with the dominant nationalist view of statehood in Africa. Many
nationalist African leaders came up with different slogans in this
regard. As Thomson cites, Mozambique’s president Samora Michel is
quoted as saying that “for the nation to live, tribe must die” (Thomson
2010: 37).
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In its constitution and oath of allegiance, the SYL required its members to identify themselves by their Somali nationality, not by their
clan. According to article 52 of its statute, new members had to take
an oath of allegiance that included, “In times of trouble, I promise to
help the Somali. I will become the brother of all other members. I will
not reveal the name of my tribe. In matters of marriage, I will not discriminate between the Somali tribes and the Midgan, Yibir, Yahar and
Tumal” (Trunji 2015: 17). Unfortunately, as Mohamed Trunji (2015)
rightly pointed out, the good intentions did not prevent the young
and idealist members of the movement from practicing clannism when
they inherited the state.
The Republic of Somalia was born in 1960 out of the two regions
that became independent (British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland).
However, the new state became the home of all Somalis, regardless
of whether their region was independent or under the administration
of colonial states. In retrospect, one can point out many Somalis from
regions outside the republic that were part of the leadership of the
country. Two reasons can be given for this inclusive approach. First,
most Somali clans identify with the Republic in one way or another.
There are examples of Darod, Dir, Digil, Mirifle, Isaaq and Hawiye clans that traditionally settled in different parts of the Western
Somalia, Djibouti and Northern Frontier District (NFD) besides the
Republic. In this case, even if the new state wanted to discriminate and
represent only those people that came from British Somaliland and
Italian Somaliland, they could not enforce this decision. Second, the
nationalist leaders of the time never recognized the partition of Somalia. The general understanding was that the rest of the country will
become independent and join the Republic in due time.
Besides national identity, each Somali is a member of a clan. This
strong identity has a long history. With the return of Italy and the
Trusteeship system in the 1950s, clannism regained ground in politics. Somalis divided government seats using clan groupings and territorial council members in Italian Somaliland were mostly clan chiefs
(Castagno 1959; Trunji 2015). However, as the younger and more educated generation joined the political process, the use of clan names for
political parties was discouraged (Castagno 1959: 349). Initially, some
groups ignored this call. The leaders of the Digil and Mirifle clans and
several clan leaders that were members of the Conferenza coalition,
which consisted of a number of parties that opposed the SYL and
called for the return of the Italians (Trunji 2015), named their parties
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after their clans. Abgal, Mareehan, Shidle and Moblin are other examples of this. By 1960, some of these parties changed their clan names.
However, in substance, the system reflected the parochial interests of
clans.
In 1969, even though the regime banned the use of clan names
and rejected clannism in theory, military leaders employed nepotism
in practice. The famous chain of poems of Deelleey2 that Mohamed
Hashi Dhama, nicknamed “Gaarriye,” and Mohamed I. Warsame
“Hadraawi” started is about a debate between two groups. Gaarriye,
Hadraawi and many others believed clannism was the main problem.
The government practiced it, and it should be eliminated. The opposing camp, which included Ahmed Farah Ali (Idaajaa), Abdulkadir
Hersi Yamyam and Mohamud Abdullahi Isse (Sangub), maintained
that clannism has solid cultural and historical roots, and it would take
a long time to eliminate. This chain is perhaps the best and only debate
that Somali poets and composers engaged in on the nepotism that
resulted from both the collectivist and strong tribal identity, and the
individualistic approaches to citizenship in Somalia (Deelleey 1979–
1983).
By the late 1970s, the many Somalis who did not have the opportunity to participate in politics through peaceful means organized
themselves along clan lines, crossed to Ethiopia and openly challenged
the Siyad Barre government. After a long and destructive civil war,
Somalia’s faction leaders decided to embrace clan identity as the basis
of political representation. In Sodere, Ethiopia in 1997, they adopted
the 4.5 clan formula—that is each of the four main clans would get
equal numbers of seats (61 members) while a number of unarmed
clans would get 31 seats (half of one so-called major clan).
Unlike the exclusivist clan identity, Islam unites all Somalis. Almost
all Somalis are Sunni Muslims. That said, there are powerful Islamist
movements that are at least as old as the Somali state (Elmi 2010).
Besides Sufi traditions, a number of Islamist groups engaged in
Islamic prorogation (Dawa) and political activism from the 1960s to the
present. Most of these groups have accepted and worked within the
Somali state. Like the early generation of Somali nationalists, most of
the Islamic movements’ leaders expressed territorial dispute with the
neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya. However, al-Shabaab
is an exception as it rejects all colonially imposed boundaries. As
such, one can say many Islamists, including moderates, have worked
towards strengthening and thickening the Islamic identity of Somalis.
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Each of the above three identities (national, clan and Islam) is
thick or thin depending on the strength of the education system that
nourishes it (Elmi 2010). There is a strong, informal education system
linked to the tribal system in Somalia. When children are young they
learn how the kin system works, and which clan and sub-clan they
belong to, and how the clans relate to each other. This is embedded in
the language and culture. Moreover, most Somalis learn the basics of
Islam from Islamic and Quranic schools. There are religious scholars
that provide this education system informally and instill the Islamic
identity.
Unfortunately, Somalia’s national identity did not have an education system that is linked to it or institutional practices that thickened it. Even though there were civics classes in the first 10 years of
independence, the military regime changed the education system and
replaced civics with Kacaan (Revolution) and Barbaarinta iyo Cilmiga
Beesha (Social Studies of the Community). By all standards, educational and other institutions were not employed in constructing and
thickening the national identity effectively.
From the above analyses, one can see that the Republic (1960–1990)
struggled to address both the civic and the identity aspects of citizenship. Its policies were confused, at best, when it came to properly
identifying who was included and excluded in the new state. This confusion still haunts the progress of building the Somali state and there
continue to be sporadic discussions on the subject. Recently, members of the parliament traveled to a number of countries to gauge the
views of the diaspora. If anything, the debate on the subject shows that
Somalis are in a very early stage in the conception of the citizenship.
With respect to the provision of civil, political and social/economic
rights, it seems that laws are for the books while in reality a different
political culture is practiced based on clan membership rather than
civic citizenship.
V. Challenges and Opportunities
This brings me to the final section of my analysis—the challenges and
opportunities of developing an inclusive national citizenship in Somalia. There are three key challenges in constructing inclusive and equal
citizenship for all Somali citizens. First, citizenship is an offshoot of a
state and the essence of the state of Somalia is contested (Menkhaus
2014; Bryden 2013). The question of whether the citizens of the Repub-
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lic of Somalia that were born in 1960 will have one or more states is
not settled yet. As things stand at the time of writing this article, the
Republic of Somalia exists only on paper. Somaliland, which was one
of the two regions that created the republic, has openly been seeking to
secede since 1991. It created its own functioning polity albeit one that
is not recognized internationally. Additionally, Puntland has also been
operating a de-facto state since 1998 (Menkhaus 2014). In the politicians’ rhetoric, Puntland is part of Somalia, but in substance it has little
to do with Mogadishu’s authority.
From the international community’s perspective, prior to the New
Deal3 (a project designed in order to engage Somali authorities) in
Brussels in 2012, Somalia was divided into three development zones—
Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia. Relief and development aid was divided among these three regions. However, when
Somaliland refused to participate in the New Deal, the international
community decided to engage the country by dividing it into Somalia
and Somaliland (Hearn and Zimmerman 2014).
Interestingly, a few more regions emerged from the South-Central
zone. First, although the Somali government resisted its formation,
with the help of Kenya, Jubaland was inaugurated in 2013 (Elmi 2015).
Additionally, after long disagreement among politicians of the Digil
and Mirifle clans and the Somali government, a South-West state that
represented three regions was created in 2015. Moreover, the government in Mogadishu single-handedly established the Galmudug state,
which led to controversy and open conflict between Galmudug and
Puntland. Nonetheless, the government is in the process of creating
Hiiraan-Shabelle state in Jowhar and determining the status of the capital Mogadishu.
The relationship of these states and that of the central government
in Mogadishu is complex. The standard practice has been that each
state operates as an independent polity. The leadership in Hargaysa
has articulated its intention to create an independent Somaliland. The
leaders of other states behave in the same way as in Somaliland. They
have their own security, foreign affairs and economic policies. They
openly deal with the neighboring countries that helped to establish
all these states and now have a say in the state-building project (Elmi
2015). The Mogadishu government, meanwhile, has not been able to
control the behaviors of these other states. In practice, Ethiopia and
Kenya deal with the divided political elite of Somalia as competing
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clans, not as a responsible state. Ultimately, where there is no state,
there is no citizen.
Ironically, even though these states do not respect the authority of
the central government, Somalis, regardless of the region they live,
use the passport of the defunct Somali state. Citizens of Somalia have
the right to nationality and identity cards, the two key documents that
prove the nationality of a person (Keller 2014). Somaliland attempted
to create its own passport, but because it is not recognized internationally, most of its citizens use the Somali passport when traveling overseas (Samatar and Samatar 2003).
Each state has its own constitution that defines citizenship of the
region as a real-estate for one-clan family. The rights to land and political participation are strictly limited to specific groups. This autochthony is based on traditional claims of what the literature calls the
“sons of the soil” (Boas and Dunn 2013). In the case of Somalia, there
are hundreds of thousands of Somalis that have been displaced
because of conflict or draught. These internally displaced persons
(IDPs) moved from one part of their country to another part that was
safer. Yet, the administrations of the states where they live do not consider them citizens. In the past, Somaliland and Puntland forcefully
ordered these IDPs to leave. Recently, Somaliland’s Interior Minister
ordered what he called “foreigners” including Somalis from the south
to leave Somaliland.
In comparison, Ethiopia and Nigeria have experienced similar
issues. Both countries have attempted to accommodate multiple ethnicities and languages in their countries. Even though citizenship at
the national level is guaranteed in the constitution, each state (in Nigeria and Ethiopia) has been identified with a particular ethnic group
(Keller 2014). The ethnic groups that identify with the particular states
have excluded others and limited their rights (Manby 2010). In both
cases, the national government controls the natural resources of the
country and have strong national armies that can control the centrifugal tendencies. In Somalia, the regions are way too powerful and
therefore the majority clan that is identified with a given state owns
the entire region. The rest of Somalis are, at best, guests (Marchal 2002;
Menkhaus 2006; Barnes 2006; Cassanelli 2015).
The second challenge in constructing citizenship in Somalia is in reconciling the role of the individual and that of the collective groups—
clan identity. It is not clear whether the Somali state is for individual
citizens or for the collective groups such as clans. Often the debate
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is framed as though clans are the primary rights holders. There is
an over-emphasis on the fluid clan identity in political dispensations,
which has a long history. During the colonial era, Somali clans were
divided into Italian-protected tribes, British-protected tribes and Abyssinian-protected tribes. For example, the colonial agreement between
Italy and Ethiopia defined the boundary in terms of clans (Touval
1963). This had negative implications for many clans that lived on both
sides of the artificial boundary. For the sake of clarity, if a person’s clan
is not Ethiopian or Kenyan, he or she cannot claim citizenship even if
born there.
The third challenge is that the sense of obligation towards the state
is absent from the understanding of many Somalis, who see the state as
an entity that is just there to benefit them. While everyone expects the
state to provide security, economic opportunity and national identity,
few voluntarily pay taxes or participate in civic duties. In fact, Somali
authorities at all levels struggle to collect taxes from citizens (Leeson
2007). There are many stories that illustrate an evidence of “all-rights
and no-obligations mentality” or “Aan maalno hasheenna Maandeeq”
(Let’s milk our Maandeeq she-camel)—a famous Somali song. Somalis
in diaspora often use money transfer agencies to send remittances to
their families. As a member of this community, I asked a number of
operators of the transfer agencies whether they have met anyone sending money to the Somali government. None had ever seen this. As long
as able citizens (financially) are not paying for their own security and
welfare, state formation will take a long time.
Consequently, in 2016, the budget of Somalia’s national government
is USD200 million (East African 2015). If you add the budgets of all of
the states (Somaliland, Puntland, South-West, Jubbaland, Galmudug
and others), the total is about USD500 million. The Somali state cannot
be expected to function properly with such small financial resources.
Ironically, the country has the potential to significantly increase its
revenues. Businessmen, who are not willing to pay taxes, control all
the sectors that could contribute to revenue generation. At the national
level, these powerful business interests have blocked the bills that
should regulate the private sector.
Despite the challenges explained above, there are at least three opportunities that are present and can be capitalized on in constructing inclusive and national citizenship in Somalia.
First, unlike many African countries, Somalia is “a nation in search
of a state” (Laitin and Samatar 1987). Somalis share culture, religion
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and language, similar socio-cultural background and a common destination. For serious state builders, the default position of the Somali
people, in terms of the common attributes they share, is a great opportunity. This, however, does not mean that homogeneity is a panacea and heterogeneity is a curse. In fact, homogeneity did not help
Somalia avoid its long civil war. There are also many countries with
heterogeneous populations that have lived in peace and harmony.
The argument here is that common culture, language and religion is
an advantage that can be used in constructing inclusive national citizenship. In fact, during the anti-colonial struggle, Somali nationalists
utilized the homogeneity of the Somali nation, and to some extent it
worked. That said, Somalia’s current political classes have failed to
transform this into a viable national project.
Second, colonial and Somali government policies (from the Italian
invasion in the Horn of Africa in the 1930s) and natural disasters (the
latest famine of 2011) created opportunities where Somalis intermingled with each other as people moved from one region to another
in large numbers. This important development created new realities
where many people who left their hometowns for different reasons
moved to other regions. In the past, many Somalis from the northern regions moved and settled in the southern part of Somalia. For
instance, during the 1974 drought, often known as the Dabadheer, tens
of thousands of Somalis were re-settled in the Jubba and Lower Shabelle regions. Many went back to their hometowns after the drought
while many more stayed behind. Moreover, besides more than one
million refugees in neighboring countries, there are more than 1.2 million internally displaced people in Somalia today (Hammond 2014).
War, drought and at times floods have forced many people in the
south to move to other regions of the country.
The fact that people from different parts of the country are now
living in close proximity can be considered an opportunity. People
come to know each other and establish business ventures together. For
state-builders, this can be used to enhance social harmony and peace.
However, as noted above, this can also be a challenge that results in
communal violence if it is not managed constructively.
Third, since the Somali state collapsed in 1991, there has been no
government that could guarantee the territorial integrity of the country. Yet on paper, Somalia is still a state with all of its juridical powers.
This happened because of the international community’s decision to
discourage centrifugal tendencies. The attitude is that there is only one
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state-sovereignty for the country and it will be rented to the UN agencies and neighboring countries while Somalia’s political class matures.
The case in point is the practice of the regions. Somaliland established
a functioning administration in 1991 and is far ahead when it comes to
governance compared to the rest of the country. However, it has been
seeking international recognition for more than two decades. Regardless of whether the case of Somaliland has merit, it is the international
community that refuses to recognize Somaliland as a state, but rather,
to assist it using other means. Although other Somali regions substantively behave as though they are independent, they have not openly
sought independence.
VI. Conclusion
Citizenship is a dynamic concept that has evolved throughout time.
At any given time new groups are being included in polities. Somali
laws and governments failed to address the challenges associated with
this concept, partly because of state failure and partly because of poor
capacity and lack of will of the political classes. The civil war was the
result of this poor response to the citizenship question.
In this article, I argued that the contestation of the essence of the
Somali state, clan claims of ownership of territories and the all-rights
and no-obligations mentality of Somalis are the main challenges to
constructing inclusive citizenship. In addition, I contended that a
homogeneous population, inter-regional movement of that population
and the international community’s decision to control the centrifugal
tendencies present crucial opportunities for building civil citizenship.
Afyare A. Elmi is an Assistant Professor at the International Affairs
Department, Qatar University. The author may be contacted at elmi@
qu.edu.ca.
Notes
1. See Article 6(4) of the Somali Constitution which says “The Somali Republic promotes,
by legal and peaceful means, the union of the Somali territories and encourages solidarity among the Peoples.”
2. Deelleey or Silsiladdii Deelleey is a chain of poems in which Somali poets and composers
engaged each other on the subject of clannism from 1979–1983.
3. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, in general, is an agreement between
fragile states, civil society and international partners which aims to improve development policy and practice in fragile states (International Dialogue 2016).
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